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Abstract
This paper investigates and compares the effects of the Fed’s quantitative
easing policies on US inflation during the Global Financial Crisis and the Covidera up to February of 2022. As inflation continues to rise, a quantitative
measurement of the Fed’s monetary policy response to recessions and its
resulting effect on the price level is becoming increasingly relevant. Supporting
the quantity monetary theory, I test the impact of the Fed’s increasing their total
assets and securities on their balance sheet on CPI and core CPI. Using multiple
time series regressions and a single lag component on the analyzed variables.
The model best fit the GFC-era data; however, the model saw greater impact of
the predictor variables on CPI in the Covid-era data. The model showed that the
lag variables were less significant. To determine statistically significant lead times
and the quantitative effects of an increase of the money supply, a data set that
contains the entire inflationary cycle associated with the Coronavirus pandemic
must be used. Future models between an increase in the money supply and
inflation are expected to yield greater significance.
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1. Introduction
From 2007 to 2009 the United States experienced the worst economic crisis
in recent memory, the Great Recession. Subsequently the world felt the effects in
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2009. When the US housing market bubble
started to burst the value of Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) went into a free
fall. Leduc (2008) summarizes that the derivative market of Collateralized Debt
Obligations (CDOs) worth $400 billion had been insured with Credit Default Swaps
(CDS) that were worth almost 20 times that amount. With the CDOs becoming
increasingly less valuable and credit default swaps being cashed in, the banks
holding these MBS ran into solvency issues. With the largest banks in the US being
holders of a large quantity of these over insured and tanking securities, the “Too
Big to Let Fail” doctrine was brought back into the political and financial
conversation.
The Fed, stymied by the failings of conventional monetary policy tactics,
took a new radical approach to combat the recession. Led by the 14th Chair of the
Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, the Fed attempted quantitative easing (QE) or
unconventional monetary policy (UMP) in the latter part of November 2008.
Backed by the Modern Monetary Theory, the members of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors decided to purchase hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of
mortgage-backed securities. These policies of the Fed were known as the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (CPFF). These policies increased the Fed’s treasury notes from $700
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billion to over $2 trillion by June 2010. The second round of QE was closely
followed by the Federal Reserve announcement that there would be another
purchase of $600 billion in treasury securities and that this would be done by the
end of June 2011. These purchases helped stabilize the economy and provided a
much-needed boost in market confidence according to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF).
Sims (2008) states that Ben Bernanke insisted that these measures that the
Fed were undertaking, purchasing extremely risky assets should be done outside
of their own balance sheet and should have explicit Congressional approval.
However, even with the purchases that were not approved by Congress, as they
did not need to be, have huge potential risk to the fiscal health of the United States
economy.
The coronavirus pandemic is the next major economic crisis that the US is
facing and with the success of QE during the great recession the Fed decided to
pursue similar policy measures. For the past 20 years before the pandemic the
money supply has increased by a little over 6% per year with the consumer price
index increasing by an average of 2.2% per year. In 2020 alone the money supply
increased by over 25% and inflation is on the rise. From December of 2020 to
December of 2021 inflation rose by 6.9% according to US Bureau of Labor
Statistics. With such increases in the money supply and inflation continuing to rise
there is a worry that these unconventional monetary policies may have dramatic
repercussions. Which begs the questions, what exactly is the impact of QE on
inflation and how does the affect change in different economic crises? Considering
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Irving Fisher (1911) and the quantity theory of money:

MV=PT

(1)

there is a direct relationship with money supply and prices. Therefore, an increase
in the money supply would have a positive effect on the rate of inflation.
I aim to understand the impact that the Fed has on inflation in the long run
by understanding the times that the Fed has undergone monumental increases in
their balance sheet. In this paper I use existing literature to conduct a systematic
review of the implications that the policies implemented by the Fed have on
inflation and inflation dynamics during recessions and shocks. I condensed the
relevant research into a streamlined summary of the available data to represent
the current community understanding of the relationship at play.
I use regression model testing to analyze the relationship that Fed asset
purchases have on inflation levels by creating a time series using monthly data on
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and a controlled CPI, the Fed’s balance sheet value
of total assets as well as their security holdings. Two time periods’ policies are
analyzed. One being the GFC from 2007 to 2011 and the other being the Covidera from December of 2019 to February of 2022. The results show that the model
fits better within the GFC-era than the Covid-era due to problems with significance.
Within the data there are also opposing effects in the different periods as well as
the impact of the Fed’s increase in total assets and their security purchases.
Furthermore, I discuss how these results came to be and the limitations of the data
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due to the methods used and time framing issues. I write about the implications for
policy makers and financial markets and elaborate on how to enact further
research on the subject and its importance.

2. Literature Review
This paper is a comparative analysis on quantitative easing’s effect on
inflation during the GFC and the Covid-era up to February 2022. First, I will assess
the literature of the topic in a broad scope of the relationship between money
supply and inflation. Then will defend the control variables chosen for their impact
on inflation by assessing their strengths and weaknesses against the Fed’s
monetary policy impact. The foundational theory of this relationship is the quantity
theory of money. With a change in the money supply a similar change to inflation
will follow. This understanding is supported by studies done by Lucas (1986), Barro
(1993), McCandless and Weber (1995) among others. However, the strength of
the relationship between nominal changes in the quantity of money and their
subsequent effect on inflation have not been agreed on. Brillembourg and Khan
(1979) analyzed the relationship with data from 1870 to 1975 and found that impact
varied throughout the period. Sims (1994) would go further to argue that monetary
policy has little effect on the price level and has more to do with fiscal policy. Which
is more in line with how the Fed previously operated when controlling for inflation
by means of adjusting interest rates.
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This is contradicted with Nelson (2008) by explaining that in the long run
constant increases in the money supply will inevitably lead to increases in inflation.
For the short-term effects inflation can largely be controlled by coordinating interest
rates, however the consequence of nominal increases in the money supply will
inevitably be seen in inflation. Lead times are difficult to measure as there is much
deviation historically as pointed out by Brillembourg and Khan (1979). This
conundrum is later analyzed within the scopes of inflation dynamics through
financial shocks in Abbate, Eickmeier, and Prieto (2021).
Abbate et al. (2021) concludes that the “only modest disinflation”
experienced by the US in the GFC was due to the decrease in demand and the
contemporary financial shock. And according to Yue and Leung (2011) the QE that
was implemented by the Fed between late 2008 and June of 2011 had no
relationship between the inflation that was observed during that period. Yue and
Leung used a paired t-test and ANOVA when analyzing the money supply (M2)
and inflation (CPI2) which yielded no significant result in the causality of inflation
due to increasing the money supply. In fact, inflation dipped lower during QE than
what it had been at the beginning of QE. Reasoning for this has not reached a
conclusion within the literature however Yue and Leung (2011) speculate that this
could be due to the decreasing trend of loans. While Abbate et al. (2021) would
sympathize with that speculation, they assert that “they [and the community]
remain fully agnostic about the effects of financial shocks on inflation dynamics”.
Ball and Mazumder (2011) further stipulates that inflation did not fall as
expected when using the Phillips curve to predict inflation over the time period of
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the Great Recession. Furthermore, Ball and Mazumder (2011) discovered that
expected inflation has been fully “shock-anchored” for decades and that “level
anchoring” has been limited but significant. Therefore, while a key factor in real
inflation dynamics, expected inflation anchors inflation in its predictions. Which
helps control for large upticks in inflation during financial shocks such as the one
in the GFC and the Covid-era. The Phillips curve in this study also has its own
constraints as it does not factor in aggregate demand which has a bearing on
inflation and unemployment independently.
The Covid-era inflation has seen a dramatic increase with the CPI
increasing by 6 percent from February to November of 2021 with the number only
increasing since. Studies are few and far between when analyzing inflation in
relation to Fed’s quantitative easing due to the contemporary nature of this
phenomenon. Which allows this paper to attempt to dig into the causal relationship
myself.
The understanding I wish to acquire within this study is how the Fed’s grand
actions in the short run may affect inflation in times of crisis. Sims (2008) addresses
the US central bank’s balance sheet impact on inflation by spelling out the specific
job, limitations, and oversight that the Fed has over the business cycle. The Fed’s
objective is to maintain homeostasis and growth of the economy and provide the
country with every measure it can to enable those. While inflation may be affected
by a variety of factors I wish to control for as much as possible within the monetary
policy scope.
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3. Data
The investigative goal of this analysis is to better understand the effect that
the Fed’s policy of quantitative easing has on inflation. More specifically in the twotime frames of the Global Financial Crisis and during the ongoing coronavirus
pandemic. Dewald (1998) states that inflation has been heavily linked to the
quantity theory of money, the research process continues with determining the
measure of impact that increasing the Fed’s Balance Sheet has on inflation during
large financial shocks and subsequent recessions. One being the determining
factor for the unconventional monetary policies’ inception and the other a
contemporary reminder of the Fed’s ongoing analysis of said theory. This paper
uses countrywide data from the Great Recession and the Covid-19 era, up until
February of 2022, to better interpret how the Fed’s UMP practices affected inflation
during the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression and the next
recession fourteen years later.
All the data that is used is provided by the FRED (Federal Reserve
Economic Data) and the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics). More specifically from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland,
which posts aggregate economic data from U.S. government credited economic
sources in this consolidated site. Table 1 provides the variables used and their
broad definitions.
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Table 1. Variable Descriptions
Base Variable

Definition

Inflation (CPI & Core CPI)

Monthly CPI and CPI less food and energy as measured
by an index of an aggregate of prices paid by urban
consumers, seasonally adjusted.

Fed’s Total Assets

Monthly monetary value of total assets held in Fed’s
balance sheet.

Fed’s Held Securities

Monthly monetary value of all securities held outright in
Fed’s balance sheet

M2 Money Supply

Monthly measure of the volume of money including M1
and highly liquid assets held by the public.

Expected Inflation

Monthly 10-year anticipated inflation by modeling with
treasury yields, inflation swaps, and expectations of
survey-based measures.

Federal Funds Rate

Monthly interest rates that depositing firms can trade
federal funds.

Unemployment Rate

Monthly percentage of those unemployed in the labor
force.

The object of this paper is to compare how QE has affected inflation during
the Covid era up until February of 2022 and the GFC. This precipitates the need
for two or more measures to be taken of the same base characteristics in two time
periods to study the differences. Thus, the two measures require two tables of
summary statistics.
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Table 2 provides summary statistics of the monthly values for each variable
less the lagged total assets and securities for the GFC period after modification,
illustrated in Section 4. Lagged variables are excluded as with a single period lag
the summarization of the data would be the same minus a single observation. The
same will be observed for table 3.

Table 2.

Summary Statistics of GFC-era Variables
count

mean

sd

min

max

CCPI
CPI
M2
Exp

50
50
50
50

218.4536
216.0498
15.92337
2.020321

3.990251
4.542154
.0677693
.2735035

210.392
207.234
15.80072
1.546064

225.218
225.395
16.03858
2.67182

FFR

50

1.238362

1.729107

.0709677

5.258387

UR

50

7.852

2.038731

4.6
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Total Assets

50

14.33598

.4480975

13.67398

14.87015

Securities

50

13.51022

.3275866

13.0704

14.30519

Table 3 provides summary statistics of the monthly values for each variable
for the Covid period after modification, illustrated in Section 4.

Table 3.

Summary Statistics of Covid-era Variables
count

mean

sd

min

max

CCPI
CPI
M2
Exp

27
27
27
27

273.3145
266.0008
16.7626
1.511119

7.091562
8.712021
.1083964
.2026956

265.606
255.944
16.54855
1.15835

287.878
284.182
16.89402
1.902745

FFR

27

.2659259

.4790717

.05

1.58

UR

27

6.4

2.903711

3.5

14.7

Total Assets

27

15.76835

.231747

15.23038

16.00129

Securities

27

15.29308

.2732163

14.64533

15.56211
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4. Empirical Analysis
I run a time series regression to test the relationship between QE and
inflation with both the GFC data set and the Covid era data set with the model:

𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐵! + 𝐵" 𝑋" (𝑡) + 𝐵# 𝑋# (𝑡) + 𝐵$ 𝑍(𝑡) + 𝑒(𝑡)

(2)

Where Y is two different measures of CPI(CPI and CPI less food and
energy), 1 is natural log of the total assets of the Fed balance sheet, 2 is the natural
log of the value of securities on the Fed balance sheet and Z are the control
variables being: the natural log of the M2 money supply, expected inflation, federal
funds rate and the unemployment rate. Taking the natural log of the variables
money supply, total assets and securities converts the variables from a unit set in
terms of dollars to percentage change when reviewing the results. This also
creates better behaved distribution and helps rein in outliers in the data set.
To effectively understand the specific effect of UMP’s direct impact on
inflation control variables needs to be within the regression as multiple factors
affect inflation dynamics as Ball and Mazumder (2011) assert. As per the quantity
monetary theory seen in Equation 1, an increase in the money supply should have
a direct and somewhat proportional effect on inflation. Unemployment has an
inverse relationship with inflation as seen in the Phillips curve outlined in Ball and
Mazumder (2011). Interest rates also have a causal effect on inflation as well as
expected inflation which is portrayed by the federal funds rate and the 10-year
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expected inflation respectively in this study. Thus, including them in the regression
helps control their effects on the underlying topic for analysis.
To maximize the number of observations in this study all data is collected
with monthly data points. Per the Federal Reserve History: The Great Recession
(2013), the GFC started in December 2007 and ended in June 2009. Allowing for
precipitating economic data, I collected data starting from June 2007 to July 2011
which is when the QE efforts to subvert the negative financial effects GFC ended.
The Covid pandemic is widely considered to have started in the early months of
2020, to account for any preliminary findings of the virus that could have affected
the financial status of the economy, I elected to collect the data starting from
December 2019 to February of 2022.
I run a time series regression to test the effect between QE and inflation a time
period later with both the GFC data set and the Covid era data set with the model:

𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐵! + 𝐵F" 𝑋" (𝑡 − 1) + 𝐵# F𝑋# (𝑡 − 1) + 𝐵$ 𝑍(𝑡) + 𝑒(𝑡)

(3)

In this secondary regression I replaced the natural logged variables of total
assets and securities with a lagged version of them both. This along with the
standard controls outlined previously, creates an interpretative result of the effect
that each of those modified variables have on CPI the following period, in this case
1 month. It is understood that increasing the money supply will increase inflation
however in this model I attempt to understand the relationship between the cause
and effect along with the time frame presented. All else remaining the same, the
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output should reflect inflation’s reaction from purchasing by the Fed the month
previous.

5. Results
Table 4 in the left column shows the regression output for Equation 2 using
the GFC data set complete with the 50 observations, monthly, from June 2007 to
July 2011. I used a time series regression to make each month a data point
individual from all others. As seen, the natural log of total assets shows that for
every percentage increase of total assets in the Fed’s balance sheet there is a
decrease of 2.21 units of the core Consumer Price Index. Converse to what is
commonly accepted about how the money supply impacts inflation per the quantity
theory of money. As a positive correlation would fit more closely to what is
accepted throughout the literature on the subject. With a p-value of .002 this
appears to be highly significant which corroborates with previous findings and
community understanding of the Fed’s balance sheet in relation to the CPI less
food and energy. The log of securities held outright by the Fed has an even more
significance with a p-value of .001 and a positive correlation of every 1% increase
in securities there is a change of 2.82 units in the inflation index. With a R-squared
value of .98 the data accounts for a large percentage of the core CPI change.
The right column of table 4 shows a similar regression output to left with the
same data inputs but replacing the logged total assets and securities with a lag of
the same thus using Equation 4. The Total Assets on the right side illustrates the
15

lag on total assets has a coefficient of -2.94 which is greater than the non-lagged
estimate showing a larger effect on inflation the month succeeding than in the
same month. A p-value of 0.000 is perfectly significant which indicates there may
be an error in the data as that level of mirroring is seldom seen. Likely caused by
insufficient data to control for unregistered effects on inflation dynamics. Securities
in the lagged column holds the same p-value to that of the value in the non-lagged
column but with less effect on inflation following that time stamp. This lessening
effect may be caused by the time series format set to monthly and closer
examination of when the effects of purchasing securities are most impactful may
be prudent. There is also a marginal increase in the R-squared illustrating that this
better explains the variance in the core CPI.

16

Table 4:

Regressions Run with GFC-era Data and Core CPI
Non-Lagged
Lagged
Variables: Coefficients
Variables: Coefficients
Total Assets: -2.210**
(0.834)
Securities: 2.821***
(0.818)
M2: 37.209***
(8.653)
Exp: 0.532
(0.599)
FFR: -1.128***
(0.257)
UR: 0.116
(0.119)
Constant: -381.051***
(125.434)

Total Assets: -2.940***
(0.803)
Securities: 2.355***
(0.757)
M2: 46.527***
(7.769)
Exp: 0.427
(0.576)
FFR: -0.763***
(0.238)
UR: 0.314***
(0.106)
Constant: -514.480***
(110.663)

Observations: 50
R-squared: 0.984

Observations: 49
R-squared: 0.986

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5 represents the same regression run in table 4 with GFC-era data
however the dependent variable is switch from core CPI to just CPI to achieve a
more robust result. The left column (non-lagged) shows a -10.2 coefficient of total
assets to CPI. Which indicates that for every percent increase of total assets CPI
should lower by 10 points. This has strong significant results and a standard
deviation of only 1.8. Securities has the opposite effect on CPI of all items as the
coefficient has a positive value of 5. According to the model for every single percent
increase of the Fed’s security holdings it would increase the CPI 5 index points. All
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the control variables besides unemployment rate and securities have p values
under .01 however the R-squared has the lowest value of all regressions within the
model with .9. Still a strong R-squared however it shows that this regression’s
variables account for the least amount of deviation of CPI.
The right side (lagged) of table 5 reflects the same regression on the left
side of table 5 but with the two predictor variables of the natural logs of total assets
and securities lagged with a lead time of one. This regression uses GFC-era data
and CPI. The lagged regression has similar variable significance with a slight
difference in the constant variables significant. The constant for the lagged variable
regression less significant than its twin on the left side. Lagged total assets
coefficient indicates that for every percentage increase of total assets the month
before there will be a drop of the CPI by 13 index points in the current month.
Conversely securities which has a similar significance to its not lagged counterpart
on the other side of the table has a coefficient of 4.27 indicating a rise of 4.27 index
points in the CPI for a percent increase of securities in the month prior.
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Table 5.

Regressions Run with GFC-era Data and CPI of All Items
Non-Lagged
Lagged
Variables: Coefficients
Variables: Coefficients
Total Assets: -10.221***
(1.847)
Securities: 5.07**
(2.245)
M2: 82.939***
(24.503)
Exp: 5.019***
(1.414)
FFR: -2.918***
(0.762)
UR: -1.141
(0.334)
Constant: -1024.152***
(361.698)

Total Assets: -13.231***
(1.786)
Securities: 4.274**
(1.663)
M2: 107.003***
(18.467)
Exp: 3.829***
(1.209)
FFR: -1.859***
(0.565)
UR: -0.407
(0.323)
Constant: -1358.332**
(269.061)

Observations: 50
R-squared: 0.9

Observations: 49
R-squared: 0.924

standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The left column (non-lagged) of table 6 shows the regression of Equation 3
using the Covid era data set. Total assets are seen to have the opposite effect
shown in table 4 and 5 has a positive relation with the dependent variable, inflation.
With a coefficient of 48.47, for every 1% increase in total assets there is a
momentum shift of CPI increasing. Though coupled with the p-value of .197, larger
than .05, it is statistically insignificant. Therefore, the effect of total assets cannot
be seen in this output with confidence. However, securities have a negative effect
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of 56.36 for every percentage increase in the value of securities held in the Fed
balance sheet. With a p-value of .05 it can be concluded that this is significant. The
R-squared values are less than that of the previous data sets regression outputs
and do a poorer job of expressing the components of the variance in core CPI.
The lagged column (right side) of table 6 shows the results of the Equation
4 regression model using the 26 observations between December 2019 and
February of 2022. Both the lag of logged total assets and securities are seen to
have significance with a p-value of .03 and .009 respectively. Total assets in this
format are seen to have the greatest impact on core consumer price index with a
coefficient of 70.13. This is to say for every percentage increase of total assets the
CPI increases 70.13 units. While securities again have a negative effect of 88.08
units per every 1% increase on CPI.
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Table 6.

Regressions Run with Data from Covid-era and Core CPI
Non-Lagged
Lagged
Variables: Coefficients
Variables: Coefficients
Total Assets: 48.467
(36.349)
Securities: -56.355**
(26.956)
M2: 56.678
(60.221)
Exp: 19.808
(8.980)
FFR: -6.093
(5.960)
UR: -0.293
(0.499)
Constant: -605.598
(695.607)

Total Assets: 70.129**
(29.312)
Securities: -88.081***
(28.469)
M2: 101.812***
(27.640)
Exp: 11.455
(8.291)
FFR: -4.865
(5.329)
UR: -0.792**
(0.354)
Constant: -1,203.953**
(423.947)

Observations: 27
R-squared: 0.932

Observations: 26
R-squared: 0.954

standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7 represents the regressions run in the Covid-era with CPI. The left
side (non-lagged) has a R-squared of .94. Which is the middle ground of the Rsquared results found within the model. Total assets have a coefficient of 60.43
which indicates that for every percent increase of the Fed’s total assets inflation
goes up 60 index points during this contemporary Covid-era data. Unfortunately,
this statistic is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the natural log of
securities has a coefficient of -74.85. Which contrasts the effects that total assets
has on inflation within the same data. Increasing securities by a percentage point
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decreases the CPI index by almost 75 points and is statically significant. Besides
expected inflation that is the only significant result within this regression.
The right column of table 7 (lagged) has an R-square of .96 which is
relatively high for this model and illustrates that 96.5% of the variance in the CPI
within the data period is accounted for in these variables. All variables less
expected inflation show significance. The value of lagged total assets has a
coefficient of 87.15 which is the highest coefficient of total assets in this study.
According to the model the CPI will rise 87 index points for a 1 percent rise in
total assets a month before. On the other hand, a percent rise in securities a
month before will decrease the CPI by 109.9 index points.
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Table 7.

Regressions Run with Covid-era Data and CPI of All Items
Non-Lagged
Lagged
Variables: Coefficients
Variables: Coefficients
Total Assets: 60.433
(40.512)
Securities: -74.859**
(30.043)
M2: 85.871
(67.119)
Exp: 23.288**
(10.008)
FFR: -6.054
(6.643)
UR: -0.316
(0.556)
Constant: -1013.086
(775.614)

Total Assets: 87.155**
(32.489)
Securities: -109.970***
(32.92)
M2: 131.99***
(34.874)
Exp: 13.212
(8.796)
FFR: -4.499
(5.376)
UR: -0.992**
(0.392)
Constant: -1652.561***
(527.242)

Observations: 27
R-squared: 0.944

Observations: 26
R-squared: 0.965

standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

6. Discussion
The results in tables 4 through 7 show that over 90% of the variance and in
some cases 98% of the variance in the consumer price index is accounted for
within the model. The observed variables of the Fed’s total assets and securities
held outright are shown to be more significant during the GFC than during the
Covid-era in this model. However, the coefficients of these variables are much
higher, almost 20 times higher in the Covid-era. This shows that the Fed’s QE
policies did have a positive effect on inflation, parallel with the quantity money
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theory. Though the factors that influenced the rise in inflation are explained less in
the model during the Covid-era than that of the Great Recession era. Inflation rose
higher during the Covid-era than the GFC but the policies direct impact on the
inflation seen in the former period had a larger impact.
This supports the previous works of Yue and Leung (2011), Abbate et al.
(2021) and Gilchrest et al. (2015) that concluded that inflation was kept down by
other disinflation or contradictory inflation factors. The significance of the causal
relationship of the UMP contradicts Yue and Leung (2011) as inflation was
impacted by the Fed’s actions of increasing their assets and securities.
A possible explanation for the higher coefficients in the Covid-era model
may be due to the supply shocks during this time period. The surge in the
consumer price index may be exacerbated by the bottleneck of access to goods
and demand only being pent up in this time. Abbate et al. (2021) and Lim and Sek
(2015) also argue that with the interest rates being dropped even lower made
borrowing cost less expensive during a financial shock and thus propagated a
steep rise in inflation.
The results do show that the Fed’s quantitative easing implementation to
combat the Covid-era recession are overwhelmingly more impactful on the core
CPI. Which illustrates that the policy while helpful in the short run combatting an
economic shock can have drastic negative economic effects later. The Fed has
now been using quantitative easing to shock the overall financial markets for over
10 years. The results indicate that since the inception of the policy, inflation has
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continued to rise during periods of recessions. These effects have been building
with a greater impact in the latter period as the indication of the data stipulates.
Inflation is determined through a variety of factors most notably GDP and
the money supply growth per the Kim and Sek (2015) study. Unfortunately for this
paper, using monthly data points caused me to leave out GDP as another control
variable and thus could limit the study with more statistically significant results as
well as better insights into the relationships observed. Other limitations are
unknown inflation dynamics with a lot of components being unknown.
The lagged variables have mixed but lower significance than the non-lagged
variables. Which means that the lead time of the lag used may not be appropriate
in the model as it is not enough time to show the causal effect on inflation. Which
is congruent with the study done by Brillembourg and Khan (1979) that found lead
times to be about two years at times. During the time of this study, the Covid-era
is still ongoing, so I was not able to lag to an appropriate degree or at least attempt
to find evidence to suggest a time frame of the effect. For future investigations it
may be beneficial to have lags at longer intervals and be able to use the data
available at that junction. Since the community understanding of financial shocks
on inflation dynamics are “agnostic” per the Abbate et al. (2021) study it is difficult
to assert when and exactly how the QE impacts inflation. There has been success
in using sign restrictions to assert times in which inflation has external factors
affecting its overall level as Uhlig (2017) and Abbate et al. (2021) suggests.
Another issue of this study is the nature of the data which is largely limited
as shown with how the total assets of the Fed’s balance sheet and their securities
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held outright had contradictory results. These two confounding results for the most
part do not coincide with one another as an increase in the securities is also an
increase in the total assets. As for the issue of the reverse of positive and negative
correlations in the next time this proves further that the nature of the data is difficult
to analyze with clear understandings of the relationship at play.

7. Conclusion
This study investigates the causal relationship between the Fed’s QE
policies and inflation during the last two major recessions of the US. I examine the
influence that the Fed has per the quantity monetary theory with CPI less food and
energy, the Fed’s total assets on their balance sheet, the Fed’s securities held
outright, money supply, the federal funds rate, expected inflation, and the
unemployment rate. Most of the previous literature on the subject would concur
that the increase of the Fed spending into the economy would in fact have a
positive effect on inflation. With others stipulating that inflation is more dependent
on interest rates and other fiscal policies. Literature is sparse on exactly how
impactful QE has been on inflation between the GFC and during the Covid-era.
The results of this study did show a positive correlation between inflation
and increasing the Fed’s securities in the GFC era and increasing the Fed’s total
assets in the Covid-era. The data does prove a close relationship between the
dependent variable of inflation and the other determining variables as the Rsquared of each regression would indicate. The regression model fits more closely
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with the non-lagged variables as the lead times may vary during different time
periods. The model however did not behave as initially intended. With two time
periods having their total assets and securities coefficients having different integer
signs. And these signs switch between the two time periods. This would show that
the model shows an incomplete explanation of the quantity monetary theory
phenomenon.
What was seen was an increase in the total impact of the two activating
variables of total assets and securities during the Covid-era. A sharp rise in fact to
almost a 20 times multiplier. With too many convoluted external and internal
stressors during these two periods the data cannot support a streamlined
summarization or predictor of the effect. As in the case of the GFC, there was a
demand shock that helped anchor inflation while the supply shock of the Covid-era
boosted inflation perhaps independent of the Fed’s QE.
I feel confident in the interpretation of the data that supports the quantity
monetary theory. Increasing the Fed’s balance sheet, namely securities held
outright, will cause a direct increase in the nation’s inflation. However, this model
does prove to be incomplete and an ignorance of inflation dynamics during
financial shocks are limiting to understanding the relationship further.
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